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Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and 
more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study 
into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the 
epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play 
in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In 
particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive 
efforts to how we represent the practical factors relevant to the task at hand, by sig-
naling the need for increased cognitive processing and evidence gathering in high-
stakes situations. I hypothesize that dysfunctional or ill-calibrated epistemic anxiety 
might play an important role in the motivation driving persons with obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) to invest high amounts of cognitive resources into the 
resolution of apparently simple and innocuous questions. As I argue, OCD might be 
conceived as a case in which epistemic anxiety is inappropriately elicited, represent-
ing these as high-stakes questions, and inadequately signaling a need for cognition. 
In this paper, I thus make use of the concept of (epistemic) anxiety as developed in 
the philosophy of emotion and in epistemology, to propose an account of the role of 
anxiety in the pathological doubt that is central to obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Keywords: Epistemic Anxiety, Epistemic Emotions, Adaptive Cognition, Obses-
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Introduction 
Being epistemically virtuous requires, among other things, well-
calibrated affective dispositions. As Adam Morton (2010, p. 388) puts it: “in 
order to acquire beliefs successfully people need to be careful, curious, imag-
inative, and responsible, all at the right moments and to the right degree”. 
Emotions might not only contribute to our being virtuous agents, but al-
so rational cognitive agents. Adaptive cognition refers to the idea that agents 
adapt their cognitive efforts to how they represent the practical factors rele-
vant to the task at hand. For instance, agents naturally invest more cognitive 
effort into resolving questions that are deemed important, with regard to 
their practical implications. Since we have only so much effort available to 
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allocate to all our endeavors, regulating the deployment of cognitive activi-
ties in a way which serves our practical interests is crucial. Ecological ra-
tionality demands that real-world concerns such as practical stakes impact 
on the amount of cognitive resources that we should be willing to invest in 
the resolution of a given question. Failing to devote available cognitive re-
sources to an important cognitive task can be profoundly detrimental. 
Likewise, devoting excessive cognitive resources to a task is irrational and 
maladaptive (Gigerenzer 2008). Emotions certainly play a crucial role in 
our ability to strike a balance between the costs in time and cognitive re-
sources that investigation involves, and the benefits of improving one’s epis-
temic position (de Sousa 1979, 1987; Gigerenzer, Todd 1999). 
Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especial-
ly interesting case study into the role of emotions for adaptive cognition. In 
this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the 
role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities 
which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this 
emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive activities to practi-
cal factors relevant to the task, by signaling the need for increased cognitive 
processing and evidence gathering in high-stakes situations. If this is so, 
then we have an emotion which helps us quickly identify those questions 
which are worth extra cognitive effort, and thereby allows us to allocate 
cognitive resources in a way which serves our practical interests. 
I further hypothesize that dysfunctional or ill-calibrated epistemic anxie-
ty might play an important role in the motivation driving persons with ob-
sessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) to invest important amounts of cogni-
tive resources into the resolution of apparently simple and innocuous ques-
tions. In OCD, persistent doubting, uncertainty and indecisiveness prevent 
the individual from carrying out daily activities. Doubt, however, is an emo-
tional reaction, and perhaps one that can best be captured in terms of epis-
temic anxiety. OCD might thus be conceived as a case in which epistemic 
anxiety is inappropriately elicited, representing innocuous questions as 
high-stakes, and inadequately signaling a need for cognition. 
When the emotion does not reliably represent the stakes involved in re-
solving a given question, this is likely to result in maladaptive epistemic 
practices. In the contrary, when it is well-calibrated, anxiety is part of an 
adaptive mechanism which helps us efficiently distribute cognitive effort. 
As such, anxiety presents a good example of the way in which emotions 
support adaptive cognition. I thus make use of the concept of epistemic 
anxiety as developed in the philosophy of emotion and in epistemology, to 
propose an account of the role of anxiety in the pathological doubt that is 
central to obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
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In what follows, I first clarify the notion of adaptive cognition and the 
type of mechanisms which contribute to our ability to adjust our cognitive 
processes to practical factors. I then present the thesis according to which 
emotions make certain features of situations or arguments more salient, 
thereby reducing the amount of information to consider in order for us to 
make decisions and act. I present anxiety as a case study and propose to fo-
cus my inquiry particularly on emotional episodes of epistemic anxiety. I 
then turn to presenting OCD, and I suggest that one of its central features – 
persistent doubt – can be understood as an excess of epistemic anxiety. I 
further specify that epistemic anxiety motivates sustained epistemic behaviors 
by representing practical stakes as high and consequently signaling the need 
for elevated evidence requirements and increased cognitive processing. 
1. Adaptive Cognition 
What are the mechanisms which support our ability to efficiently allo-
cate our cognitive resources? On what basis do we automatically spend 
more time and effort resolving certain questions? How do we set the 
threshold of evidence and for when an investigation should be terminated? 
There is a broad consensus on the idea that variations in cognitive effort 
are generally adaptive: we typically invest more or less resources in forming 
beliefs depending on the expected rewards for accuracy or costs for inaccu-
racy. We can refer to adaptive cognition as the “broad label for the idea that 
agents adapt their cognitive efforts to how they represent the practical fac-
tors relevant to the task at hand” (Gerken 2017, p. 199). According to the 
adaptive toolbox model (Gigerenzer, Todd 1999; Gigerenzer 2008), humans 
possess an adaptive toolbox, consisting of “cognitive mechanisms that evo-
lution has built into the human mind for specific domains of inference and 
reasoning, including fast and frugal heuristics” (Gigerenzer, Todd 1999, p. 
30). Some of these mechanisms hence function to help us adjust our use of 
cognitive processes to “real-world requirements” and to the practical fac-
tors we face. 
For instance, it has been proposed that the need for closure and the need 
for cognition correspond to motivational tendencies also called “epistemic 
needs”. The need for closure and the need for cognition are thought to mo-
tivate us to either stop or continue an inquiry, by representing the costs and 
benefits of acquiring a better epistemic position, given relevant factors of 
the practical context (Kruglanski 1990; Roets et al. 2015). The need for 
cognition can thus undermine and postpone the need for closing an in-
quiry, when the benefits of continuing the search for information are sali-
ent. Particularly, perceived high stakes lead to a disposition on the part of 
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the agent to improve their epistemic position with regard to p (Mayseless, 
Kruglanski 1987). 
The ability to invest more or less cognitive efforts in resolving a ques-
tion, based on practical factors such as stakes, is part of being a rational 
cognitive agent. “Ecological rationality” indeed requires that real-world 
concerns impact the reasoning that precedes decision-making (Gigerenzer, 
Todd 1999). Failing to devote available cognitive resources to an important 
cognitive task can be profoundly detrimental. Likewise, devoting excessive 
cognitive resources to a task is irrational and maladaptive (Gigerenzer 2008). 
As we shall now see, emotions certainly play a crucial role in our ability 
to strike a balance between the costs in time and cognitive resources that in-
vestigation involves, and the benefits of improving one’s epistemic position. 
2. Emotions and Epistemic Rationality: striking a compromise 
There are important cognitive functions which humans cannot perform 
successfully without relying on the efficiency-enhancing quality of emo-
tions. De Sousa (1987) and Amélie Rorty (1980) propose that emotions 
provide us with a framework for cognition, by making certain features of 
situations or arguments more prominent, giving them a weight that they 
would otherwise lack. In an influential thesis de Sousa has argued that 
“emotions are determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, 
lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies” (de Sousa 1979, p. 50). 
It is suggested that emotions act as a source of salience and relevance, 
helping agents with limited resources to reduce the number of actions and 
consequences that they should consider if they ever want to reach a deci-
sion and act. In other words, we need emotions so as not to be paralyzed in 
our decision-making by the overwhelming volume of potentially relevant 
knowledge and information.1 This directive power which emotions exert 
over cognitive processes places us in a more favorable epistemic position 
than the one which reasoning alone could grant us (Robinson 2005).2 
It seems quite clear that if we were to guide belief-formation solely on 
the basis of reflective deliberation, the questioning and search for infor-
 
1 Let me emphasize that the claim is not that the only way to narrow down information for 
an inquiry is via emotions. Cold deliberation can be sufficient and possible in certain 
circumstances (in which we have the time and all the relevant information at hand). However, 
as finite creatures with limited resources, the type of directive power which emotion exerts 
over our attentional focus plays a crucial role in our ability to deal with our environment, and 
particularly in situations where factors such as urgency and high stakes are involved. 
2 While emotions do not necessarily make our beliefs more justified or more conducive to 
knowledge, by helping us to focus on the relevant options they enable conditions for knowledge. 
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mation could go on indefinitely. As Gigerenzer and Todd (1999, p. 31) note 
“emotions can also function as heuristic principles for guiding and stopping 
information search”. Our condition as limited creatures often requires us to 
strike a balance between maximizing belief accuracy and “fast and frugal” 
decision-making. Emotions might contribute to our ability to do this by 
rendering us sensitive to practical factors impacting information search, 
such as stakes and urgency. 
In what follows, I will introduce the case of anxiety as an example of an 
emotional process which supports our capacity to be rational cognitive 
agents by directing cognitive activities and guiding the search for infor-
mation in inquiry. 
3. Introducing anxiety 
Anxiety indeed provides an especially interesting case study into the role 
of emotion for adaptive cognition. In what follows, I will argue with Nagel 
(2010) that this emotion supports our ability to adapt our cognitive activi-
ties to practical factors relevant to the task, by helping us to quickly identify 
high-stakes questions and invest greater cognitive efforts in their resolution. 
But first, let us now provide a broad introduction of anxiety and on the di-
verse and changing views regarding its potential functions. 
Folk conceptions of anxiety tend to view it in negative terms: it is said to 
be an inherently unpleasant, impairing affective state, which can paralyze us 
in moments in which we would critically need to take action. In philosophy, 
anxiety, and perhaps negative emotions more generally, have long been 
viewed as impairments to the pursuit of a virtuous life, and research has 
tended to focus on cases where it manifests in debilitating ways. Tradition-
ally, characteristic of the virtuous agent is “serenity” and “harmony” of be-
liefs within “a tranquil mind” (Kant 1797/1996; Annas 1993, 2011; Hurst-
house 1999; McDowell 1998). The idea that emotions “capture and con-
sume” our attention in a way that can have “a deleterious effect on our epis-
temic standing” is often emphasized in philosophical treatments of emotion 
(Brady 2013, p. 159). 
However, as philosophers are slowly uncovering the value and contribu-
tion of emotional states in key human achievements like knowledge, virtue, 
and well-being, the idea that a negative emotion such as anxiety would be 
intrinsically useless and even detrimental is becoming less and less convinc-
ing. Indeed, psychologists have long acknowledged the role of anxiety for 
human performance. David Barlow, clinical psychologist and founder of 
the Center for Anxiety and Related Disorders at Boston University argues: 
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we have known for almost 100 years that our physical and intellectual perfor-
mance is driven and enhanced by the experience of anxiety, at least up to a point. In 
1908, Yerkes and Dodson demonstrated this in the laboratory by showing that the 
performance of animals on a simple task was better if they were made “moderately 
anxious” than if they were experiencing no anxiety at all. Since that time, similar 
observations have been made concerning human performance in a wide variety of 
situations and contexts. Without anxiety, little would be accomplished. The per-
formance of athletes, entertainers, executives, artisans, and students would suffer; 
creativity would diminish (Barlow 2001, p. 9). 
While anxiety is unpleasant and can impact well-being if it is felt to an 
intense degree or over a long period of time, moderate anxiety is generally 
felt for good reasons and in a way that can prove beneficial, both in terms 
of the accomplishments it allows, and in terms of the protection it grants 
through making us aware of potential dangers. So what is anxiety? The 
DSM-IV proposes that anxiety corresponds to “apprehension, tension or 
uneasiness that stems from the anticipation of danger” (American Psychiat-
ric Association 1994, p. 392). Anxiety can be conceptualized, functionally 
speaking, as an adaptive warning system that directs attention onto possible 
sources of danger and motivates coping behavior, thereby allowing for a 
higher level of functioning in potentially threatening environments (Hoehn-
Saric, McLeod 2000). 
Like other emotional phenomena, anxiety plays a motivational role in 
preparing us to act in response to the type of evaluation it makes. What sort 
of evaluation does anxiety involve, and what sort of responses does it 
prompt in individuals? As David Barlow (2001, p. 64) suggests: “If one 
were to put anxiety into words, one might say, ‘That terrible event could 
happen again, and I might not be able to deal with it, but I’ve got to be 
ready to try’”. This suggests that anxiety involves an evaluation of one’s 
ability to cope with a (possible) threat, as well as a readiness to face it. Giv-
en the functional characteristics of anxiety which we have highlighted, the 
associated phenomenological characteristics might be described as follows. 
In phenomenological terms, anxiety seems to translate into 1) tension, 
unease and concern, as well as 2) vigilance, alertness, and readiness. We 
propose to understand the first set of feelings as being linked to the ap-
praisal of our lack of information – or “epistemic gap”, and the second set 
of feelings as arising in reaction to or as a consequence of this appraisal, as a 
manner of defense. 
In anxiety, it is first our lack of information – our ignorance – which 
makes us unprepared for coping with what the future may hold. Given that 
the content of anxiety also includes an epistemic gap, or the idea that the 
subject is missing some information on the potential threat (such as the 
form it might take, its magnitude, the moment it might arise, or one’s own 
EPISTEMIC ANXIETY, ADAPTIVE COGNITION, AND OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER 143 
abilities to cope with it), anxiety is first experienced as a state of vulnerabil-
ity, which creates tension, unease and concern.3 
In reaction to this, anxiety prompts caution and focuses attention. Since 
we lack information about the dangers we may encounter, when they might 
arise, what kind of defense they might require from us, etc., we resort to a 
mode of vigilance and alertness, which means that we prepare ourselves to 
respond quickly to all sorts of different dangers which may arise. 
As we shall now see, this state of vigilance and readiness can be experi-
enced in anticipation of specific events (e.g. a flight), or with a certain con-
sistency over time and across situations. Anxiety can be conceived as an 
emotion, a mood, or an emotional disposition, and I shall now clarify the 
kind of anxiety I will be interested in here. 
First of all, an important distinction with regard to anxiety is between 
trait and state anxiety. Trait anxiety refers to an individual’s stable tendency 
to experience anxiety. It can also be viewed as an emotional disposition, 
which corresponds to a tendency to experience a particular family of emo-
tions (Deonna, Teroni 2012). For instance, the anxious person will suppos-
edly have a greater than normal tendency to feel anxiety, fear, and appre-
hension, and to be alert and on the lookout for potential threat, with some 
consistency across situations and over time. 
State anxiety refers to a relatively short-lived episode of anxiety. Emo-
tional states can be defined as affective responses involving bodily sensa-
tions or feelings that are directed towards specific states of affairs, objects 
or events (which can be occurring, as well as imagined, or remembered). 
When anxiety refers to an emotion, it is therefore a relatively short-term ep-
isode elicited in response to (or in anticipation of) a specific aspect of our 
environment (an upcoming meeting, an exam, etc.).4 
I shall make clear to the reader that in this paper I am interested in dis-
cussing specific cases of anxiety in which it is an emotion, i.e. a relatively 
short-lived state in which a specific object or event is evaluated as potential-
ly threatening.5 In the following argument, I will therefore be focusing on 
 
3 These phenomenological characteristics of anxiety might be salient only in cases of 
intense and pathological anxiety. There might be cases of unconscious anxiety, which is 
phenomenologically silent and manifests itself only through its functional characteristics. 
Hence, the phenomenological characteristics described here might not be essential to all cases 
of anxiety. In an effort to propose a unified account of anxiety, applicable to the 
understanding of both typical and pathological cases, I do not want to exclude that anxiety 
plays the function I argue it does, even when it is not felt. 
4 This being said, one might be anxious without knowing why or being conscious of the 
object of one’s affective state. 
5 Like emotions, moods are associated with bodily sensations and feelings (they have a 
specific phenomenology), but they typically last for longer. Moreover, and this might be the 
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anxiety as an occurrent emotional episode, rather than a mood or a disposi-
tion, because I wish to examine the role played by this affective state when 
it is directed at a specific proposition or object. 
4. Formal object of anxiety 
As I intend to be speaking of anxiety as an emotion, i.e. an intentional 
state characterized by a specific evaluative stance, I ought to define the type 
of evaluation that is at play in anxiety. Which kind of evaluative property 
does anxiety track and respond to? In other words, what is the formal object 
of anxiety? 
Anxiety has often been defined with regard to the emotion of fear. 
However, while fear is considered a basic, fundamental, discrete emotion 
which has a clear functional value in the evolutionary sense, anxiety has 
been considered both different from discrete emotions and rather vague 
and imprecise (Barlow 2001). A difference between anxiety and fear, it has 
been suggested, could be that fear is a response to a specific source of dan-
ger, while anxiety is objectless (Öhman 1993). 
Rather than being objectless, the emotion of anxiety is felt with regard 
to a future threat, or one which is surrounded by uncertainty. It is therefore 
sensitive to subtle cues in our environment, rather than readily perceivable 
dangers. Kurth (2015, p. 5) locates the formal object of anxiety in “prob-
lematic uncertainty”. He proposes that anxiety is a sort of evaluation of cer-
tain features of our environment as revealing that our ignorance about cer-
tain matters might make us unprepared in the face of a possible threat. This 
uncertainty needs to be addressed, because it potentially involves a pro-
spect that is appraised as harmful for the individual. According to Kurth, 
anxiety is a form of evaluative awareness of a situation as involving “a threat 
or danger whose potential is unpredictable, uncontrollable, or otherwise 
open to question” (Kurth 2015, p. 5). Hence, according to this definition of 
 
main distinction between the two, while emotions have intentional objects, moods are not 
generally thought of as being elicited in response to specific objects or events. Anxiety has 
sometimes been viewed as a mood, rather than an emotion. For instance, David Barlow defines 
“anxious apprehension” (in his view a more precise term for anxiety) as “a future-oriented 
mood state in which one is ready or prepared to attempt to cope with upcoming negative 
events” (Barlow 2001, p. 64). In a somewhat similar manner, Price proposes that moods regard 
the occurrence of a situation of a certain type (i.e. an offense, a threat, etc.) and have the 
function of preparing the subject to this specific type of events: “an irritable or apprehensive 
subject will be on the lookout for a certain kind of situation; and, should it arise, will respond 
more quickly and more robustly” (Price 2006, p. 57). 
EPISTEMIC ANXIETY, ADAPTIVE COGNITION, AND OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER 145 
anxiety, the uncertainty surrounding the threat is what distinguishes the 
evaluative content characteristic of anxiety from the one characteristic of fear. 
The suggestion to define “problematic uncertainty” as the formal object 
of anxiety fits well with Barlow’s view of the kind of evaluation involved in 
anxiety as signaling the possibility of an upcoming negative event. Howev-
er, one might ask: is uncertainty a necessary feature of anxiety? It seems that 
we sometimes report being anxious about a specific event where we already 
know much of the relevant detail. For instance, we might be anxious about 
giving a talk to an audience because we have a stutter and we know (from 
experience) that some members of the audience will laugh and others will 
feel uncomfortable, or we might feel anxious about our ex bringing their 
new partner to a party. We met this new partner previously and they made 
us feel quite inadequate and sad about the break up, and sure enough this is 
what they will do again at the party. In these cases, it looks like we are anx-
ious about a known and predictable series of events.6 If we accept these as 
cases of anxiety, it looks like this undermines the relevance of Kurth’s “un-
certainty” feature of the formal object of anxiety. 
We can indeed call these instances of anxiety: these are situations in 
which we think “That terrible event could happen again, and I might not 
be able to deal with it, but I’ve got to be ready to try”. However, the fact 
that these terrible events (people laughing at me, and my ex’s girlfriend 
making me feel inadequate) have happened in the past does not allow me to 
predict that they will happen again today. My past experiences are just 
enough to create an apprehension which will help me prepare in the event 
that such similar threats should arise again. All I know is that these are situ-
ations (the party, the talk) in which there is a possibility (no matter how 
likely I evaluate it to be) that such terrible events occur. For instance, I do 
not know quite how bad things might turn out: my ex and their new part-
ner might even voluntarily humiliate me in front of my new date by pushing 
me into the swimming pool all dressed. These are risky situations, and the 
fact that I cannot predict exactly what will happen and how bad this might 
make me feel is what justifies my feeling anxious, because the object of my 
anxiety is not a general event, but the more fine-grained features of that 
event. In fact, I really wish I knew exactly how events would unfold, and if I 
were in such a state (imagine a Groundhog Day scenario), I would suppos-
edly feel fear (or resignation), rather than anxiety. 
This way of characterizing the relation of anxiety to uncertainty might 
raise some further concerns. There are certain situations – for instance tak-
ing a plane – about which one might feel anxious while there is little uncer-
 
6 I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention. 
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tainty about whether the dreaded event will happen: I am not intending to 
change my plans, so the probability that I will indeed end up flying is very 
high. In other words, in certain situations, it looks like I am anxious pre-
cisely because I know how events will unfold. I see two ways of answering 
to this concern. 
The first way is to insist on the idea that what I am anxious about is not 
an event such as “taking the plane”, but the (many) threatening possibilities 
that this event contains. All I know is that by taking the plane I expose my-
self to the possibility of many dreadful scenarios arising. Through my anxie-
ty, I evaluate “taking the plane” as a type of situation in which threatening 
possible scenarios are more likely than usual to occur. Hence, similarly to 
what I have proposed above, the uncertainty concerns the fine-grained fea-
tures of the event, and the event itself is only evaluated as carrying possibili-
ties of threat. 
A second way of answering to this concern is by proposing that, in these 
situations, the uncertainty involved in my taking the plane (or the elevator) 
might not so much concern the potential threatening scenarios which may 
unfold, but my own ability to face them. In other terms, I might be anxious 
because I do not know whether I will be able to cope with a particular situ-
ation (such as heavy turbulences). The uncertainty is here primarily about 
my own coping potential, not about future events. Here are two ways in 
which uncertainty can be said to elicit an anxious response. This being said, 
the idea that uncertainty is a constitutive element of anxiety leaves open the 
possibility of describing cases of anxiety in which this uncertainty is hidden. 
Now that we have a better idea of what anxiety is about, it still seems to 
apply to a large range of different objects, and I shall now specify the kind 
of objects I am interested in. 
5. Kinds of Anxiety 
Anxiety acts as a signal that the situation we are in contains an uncer-
tainty which we should address. It can occur within different contexts and 
domains of human life, and we can accordingly distinguish different kinds 
of anxiety. 
For instance, social anxiety can be defined as an emotional response to 
an aspect of a social interaction involving a problematic uncertainty (have I 
said something inappropriate? Have I been rude?). In this context, the un-
certainty regards whether or not I might have fallen short of social norms, 
which is surely something that I should address. 
Likewise, moral anxiety can be understood as a response to a problem-
atic uncertainty about the correctness of a moral decision I am contemplat-
ing or have made (Kurth 2015). And thus, to feel morally anxious is to view 
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one’s moral decision as possibly open to moral objection, which is again 
something that I should address. 
A third kind of anxiety is directed at epistemic uncertainties. Episodes 
of epistemic anxiety are emotions directed at some of our beliefs, or a prop-
osition we are considering for belief (the bank will be open on Saturday 
morning/the next flight for New York will leave in an hour) which is evalu-
ated as poorly supported by evidence, where this is viewed as potentially 
harmful. The emotion then raises a doubt on whether it is safe for us to 
form (or maintain) the corresponding belief. I will later argue that epistemic 
anxiety acts as a general motivation to invest greater efforts and collect 
more evidence in contexts that are evaluated as bearing important practical 
implications for us. We might consider that this is the most fundamental 
kind of anxiety, since both moral and social anxiety seem to involve subjec-
tive uncertainty and feelings of epistemic anxiety. 
In all three cases, anxiety is directed at a specific uncertainty which is 
made salient, appraised as problematic, and calling for resolution. In this 
paper, I am specifically interested in the third kind of anxiety: epistemic 
anxiety, and in its contributions to adaptive cognition. The reason why I 
want to focus on this kind of anxiety, is that I believe it might be central to 
understanding important aspects of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), 
to which I now turn. 
6. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
In the case of emotions like fear and anxiety, emotional disorder can 
take many different forms. Phobias, panic attacks, post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), pathological worry, and OCD, are all labels for types of 
disordered fear and anxiety. While the DSM-IV (1994) classifies OCD as 
an anxiety disorder, the DSM-5 (2013) creates a separate category for OCD 
and related disorders (such as hoarding, skin-picking, and body-
dysmorphic disorder). However, anxiety is recognized to play an important 
role in this disorder, which involves “marked anxiety or distress” as a diag-
nostic criteria, and compulsions that are aimed at “preventing or reducing 
anxiety” (DSM-5). Moreover, up to 76% of patients with OCD are thought 
to suffer from either generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, phobias, 
or social anxiety disorder (Diniz et al. 2012). Some clinicians even claim 
that negative emotions like anxiety play a major causal role in the disorder. 
David Barlow for instance argues that “obsessions and compulsions repre-
sent situations in which strong anxiety and/or other negative emotions (e.g., 
guilt or disgust) have overtaken rational thinking and behavior” (Barlow 
2001, p. 522). 
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The disorder most often implies two elements: obsessions “which are in-
trusive, unwanted thoughts, ideas, images, or impulses” and compulsions, 
which are “behavioural or mental rituals according to specified ‘rules’ or in 
response to obsessions” (Abramowitz, McKay, Taylor 2008, p. 5). The 
three main themes of obsessions are aggressive (such as thoughts of harm-
ing children or relatives), sexual (such as fears that one will engage in inap-
propriate acts with inappropriate partners), or blasphemous thoughts (such 
as the fear of making sacrilegious gestures in a holy place), and other 
themes such as contamination are also frequent. The most common com-
pulsive acts include repetitive checking (of locks, appliances, light, etc.), 
washing, counting, the need for reassurance seeking or unnecessary confes-
sions, and repetitive attempts to attain symmetry (Attiullah, Eisen, Rasmus-
sen 2000). 
Even if they do not develop the debilitating disorder that OCD is, a vast 
majority of individuals in the general population experiences intrusive 
thoughts and neutralizing activities on a daily basis (Rachman, de Silva 
1978; Salkovskis, Harrison 1984). Unwanted, intrusive thoughts are not ex-
clusive to OCD, and they only represent the raw material of obsessions. Ac-
cording to Rachman (2003, p. 4), it is not the thoughts in themselves, but 
the fact that individuals interpret them as revealing an “immoral, evil dan-
gerous, insane” character, which generates distress and gives rise to at-
tempts to put matters right, neutralize or suppress them, which in turn will 
contribute to their recurrence. According to most psychological accounts of 
OCD, compulsions are then performed in order to control thoughts and 
reduce the discomfort caused by the appraisal of obsessions as immoral 
and/or dangerous (Salkovskis 1985, 1999; Rachman 1993; Bolton, Hill 1996). 
7. Unreasonable doubt as inappropriate anxiety 
Understanding epistemic anxiety might be important to understanding 
OCD, because the attitude that is recognized as most characteristic of the 
disorder is that of doubt and uncertainty. Patients are not afraid of what is, 
but of what “might be”. 
OCD was once referred to as “la folie du doute” (the “questioning ma-
nia”), highlighting the central role of indecision and doubt in its sympto-
matology (Janet 1903). Nowadays, doubt is still considered an important 
feature of the disorder, and has been linked to the inability to “experience a 
sense of conviction” (Shapiro 1965), put closure on experience (Reed 
1985), or generate the normal “feeling of knowing” (Szechtman, Woody 
2004). Individuals with OCD exhibit indecisiveness which translates in 
their difficulty to make even simple decisions (Tolin et al. 2003). Moreover, 
characteristic of the disorder is an “intolerance of uncertainty” or a tenden-
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cy to hold “beliefs about the necessity of being certain” (Obsessive Compul-
sive Cognitions Working Group 1997, p. 678). 
Jeff Bell offers one of the most comprehensive reports of living with ob-
sessive-compulsive disorder in Rewind, Replay, Repeat (Bell 2006). Unre-
solvable doubting is one of the major themes of the anecdotes recounted in 
this memoir. In this passage, Bell recalls a childhood memory of the day in 
which, after hearing a boy call his name from the seat of a passing car, he is 
absorbed in an endless enquiry: 
this particular night, and I am passing its long hours deep beneath my covers, 
trying to make sense of the pictures I keep looking through my mind […] Over and 
over again, I am replaying these sequences […] I am doing all this because I have no 
choice. Two days have come and gone since the scene with the passing car played 
out for real, and I have filled them with every possible effort to determine just who 
was trying to get my attention, and why. I’m left with no viable option but to try to 
re-create for myself the ten or so seconds that hold all my answers (Bell 2006, p. 3). 
As Bell’s testimony shows, if doubt is generally beneficial with regard to 
truth-seeking, persistent doubt can paralyze an individual, leaving him una-
ble to reach decisions. When is doubt a valuable epistemic process, and 
when does it start to hinder one’s epistemic pursuits? 
If the experience of doubt is central to OCD, we need to be able to define 
what makes this doubt pathological. When is doubt considered reasonable? 
It has been proposed that doubt might be best conceived as an emo-
tional reaction. I will first introduce this view, and then argue that doubt 
might be best captured as a form of “epistemic anxiety”. The view of doubt 
as an emotion can be seen as having already featured in the works from 
James and Peirce. James indeed famously remarked: 
In its inner nature, belief or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied to 
the emotions than anything else […] The true opposite of belief, psychologically 
considered, are doubt and inquiry, not disbelief. In both these states the content of 
our mind is in unrest, and the emotion engendered thereby is, like the emotion of 
belief itself, perfectly distinct, but perfectly indescribable in words. Both sorts of 
emotion may be pathologically exalted (James 1890, pp. 283-284). 
James hence considered that doubt was best conceived as an emotion, 
and that there could be instances of pathological doubt. In a similar way, 
Charles Pierce offered a criticism of Descartes’s methodological doubt, ar-
guing that 
the mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate 
the mind to any struggle after belief. There must be a real and living doubt, and 
without this all discussion is idle […] When doubt ceases, mental action on the sub-
ject comes to an end (Pierce 1877, p. iv). 
JULIETTE VAZARD 150
In Peirce’s view, the only kind of doubt which we need to take seriously 
is the one which truly presents a proposition as demanding our attention. 
Pierce identifies as “real doubt” the doubt which involves some question or 
problem becoming salient and being literally pressed upon us. 
Hookway (1998, 2008) proposes that doubt à la Pierce is a form of epis-
temic anxiety; an anxiety directed at a proposition the truth-value of which 
we are coming to question. Doubt consists in an evaluative stance in which 
a proposition’s epistemic grounding is deemed uncertain, where this moti-
vates us to reassess its credentials. Hence, doubt might be the form that 
anxiety takes when it acts as a signal that a proposition we are considering 
is epistemically uncertain, where this could be problematic for us (given its 
practical implications). As Hookway (1998, pp. 221-222) suggests: “our 
awareness that a proposition is poorly supported may receive its primary 
manifestation in a state of doubt or of epistemic anxiety”. 
However, while epistemic anxiety seems to always imply doubt, one can 
doubt something without being epistemically anxious. Pierce opposed “real 
doubts” to “paper doubts” or theoretical doubts, which merely involve the 
putting of a proposition into the interrogative form and are not accompa-
nied by a specific phenomenology or a stimulation of the mind. Theoretical 
or “paper” doubt probably does not involve anxiety. However, theoretical 
doubt also lacks the kind of salience which truly presents a proposition as 
demanding our immediate and focused attention. It is only the “real” doubt 
– the one that is underscored by an affective state – which seems to exert a 
directive power over attention (Pierce 1877; Hookway 1998). 
In other words, doubt can be assimilated to a form of epistemic anxiety 
when it “is not merely a matter of belief or disbelief, but […] an irritation 
that causes inquiry” (Thagard 2006, p. 159). Real doubt is tied with affec-
tive states of irritation, excitement and surprise, and implies a struggle after 
belief. It is a psychological state which contains both an epistemic 
evaluation and a reason for action. As Hookway (2008, p. 62) suggests: 
“real doubts motivate me to collect more evidence, to reflect upon the 
credentials of the erstwhile belief, to worry about other beliefs which 
depend upon this one and so on”. 
If “real” doubt is essentially a form of epistemic anxiety, then doubt 
might be deemed appropriate only if the anxiety that underscores it can be 
considered an appropriate emotional reaction. If anxiety is inappropriately 
elicited, it might translate into a maladaptive motivational tendency on the 
part of the subject to engage in inquiry and sustained search for evidence. 
Unreasonable doubt (like in the case of OCD) might involve a dysfunc-
tional disposition with regard to the emotion which underscores this epistem-
ic attitude: anxiety. In what follows, I expose in more detail the mechanisms 
through which epistemic anxiety motivates sustained epistemic behaviors. 
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8. Elevated Evidence Requirements 
Anxiety, as we have previously defined it, is an emotional state in which 
a situation, an object, or a proposition is evaluated as problematically uncer-
tain. Since anxiety contains an element of uncertainty, one of the action 
tendencies of this emotion consists in attempts to acquire knowledge. The 
question is: how much evidence should one gather before one can claim 
with confidence that all chances of potential harm have been prevented? 
When it comes to safety, epistemic certainty does not seem to be within 
reach. Nonetheless, it would be reasonable for one to be motivated to 
ensure the highest possible epistemic status. 
In the psychology literature, the concept of “elevated evidence require-
ments” has been discussed as an important maintaining factor in chronic 
worry (Tallis, Eysenck, Mathews 1991).7 As Tallis (1992, p. 22) claims, “a 
worrier has to be absolutely sure that he or she is doing ‘the right thing’ be-
fore a decision can be made”. The authors suggest that “worriers” must 
consequently spend more time weighting up the relevant information in 
memory and in the environment. 
Several studies have highlighted the tendency of individuals with OCD 
to gather more evidence, take more time to perform tasks and demand 
more information to arrive at a decision than comparison groups (Stern et 
al. 2013; Banca et al. 2015; Fear, Healy 1997; Milner, Beech, Walker 1971). 
Persons with OCD display “elevated evidence requirements”: they experi-
ence the need to secure a higher level of evidence before they can resolve an 
ambiguity, reach a decision and claim knowledge. While they appear to be 
in possession of sufficient evidence that the stove is off, they seem to fail to 
achieve psychological certainty with regard to those propositions which ob-
sessive thoughts represent as bearing potential catastrophic implications. 
In OCD, we can often distinctly identify two thought components to the 
doubt: the primary inference of doubt, and the consequences or the sec-
ondary inference (O’Connor, Ardema, Pélissier 2005, p. 115). An obsession 
might for instance start with the thought: “maybe the stove is on”, and it 
might be followed by: “the house will catch fire, I’ll lose everything”. 
Where a proposition p (“the stove is on”) is appraised as problematic in 
 
7 What is here identified as worry? Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky and DePree (1983, p. 
9) suggest that “worry is a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively 
uncontrollable. The worry process represents an attempt to engage in mental problem-solving 
on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more negative 
outcomes. Consequently, worry relates closely to fear processes”. The primary function of 
worry on this view is to allow individuals to plan options and review possibilities in threatening 
situations. On this account, worry looks very much like anxiety as we have defined it here. 
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view of the potential catastrophic scenarios (“the house will catch fire, I’ll 
lose everything”) which could materialize if p turned out to be true, 
knowing for sure that non-p quickly becomes a question of life or death. 
In epistemology, a number of writers have defended the view that 
knowledge and other epistemic states are not purely epistemic, but also de-
pend upon factors which are of a practical nature. In Knowledge and Practi-
cal Interests (2005), Jason Stanley argues that what is at stake for an indi-
vidual in securing a piece of knowledge can make it more or less justifiable 
for him to look for further evidence supporting the proposition in question. 
In his view, the more important the perceived practical interests at stake in 
resolving p, the harder we will find it to have knowledge that p (Stanley 
2005). OCD seems to be characterized by a difficulty for subjects to secure 
knowledge, and a consequent tendency to continue their search and evi-
dence collection. 
Patients with OCD are aware that their worries are irrational and their 
precautions excessive, but do not seem to be able to give up on their at-
tempts to achieve certainty with regard to the propositions they obsess 
about. In the following section, I will hypothesize that epistemic anxiety is 
linked to the misplaced tendency to perceive stakes as high and conse-
quently continue the search for information. 
9. Epistemic Anxiety and Stakes 
What does epistemic anxiety have to do with the way in which we rep-
resent the practical interests at stake in resolving p as high? Earlier, we have 
emphasized the idea that emotions impact the regulation of our cognitive 
activities in a way that serves our practical interests. They act as a source of 
salience among potential objects of attention and exert a directive power 
over our cognitive processes (de Sousa 1979; Damasio 1994). In particular, 
emotions can guide us in deciding whether to stop or continue information 
search, by quickly representing relevant practical factors. In what follows, I 
will argue with Nagel (2010) that anxiety can be understood as a mecha-
nism which makes “problematically uncertain” questions salient, and sig-
nals the corresponding need for a higher level of required evidence. In rep-
resenting certain questions as high-stakes, anxiety motivates us to invest a 
larger amount of cognitive resources in their resolution. While this most 
often results in an adaptive tendency to invest more cognitive effort in the 
resolution of high-stakes questions, I will hypothesize that anxiety might be 
dysfunctional in OCD, misrepresenting stakes and motivating inquiry in a 
way which does not serve the agent’s practical interests. 
The emotion of epistemic anxiety has been associated with a motiva-
tional tendency to invest greater cognitive efforts and collect more evidence 
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in contexts that are evaluated as bearing important consequences for the 
agent. Jennifer Nagel (2010, p. 9) proposes that “epistemic anxiety”, is “a 
generic expression for the heightened need for greater evidence and more 
thorough processing that is characteristic of high-stakes situations”. As 
Nagel suggests, epistemic anxiety acts as a signal that the resolution of p will 
require significant evidence and cognitive processing, given its practical im-
plications. As a result, we will generally invest more cognitive resources into 
high-stakes questions. As Nagel remarks, a mechanism which makes us 
invest more effort in belief formation in high stakes circumstances is an 
adaptive mechanism: “In general, automatic variations in epistemic anxiety 
makes our thinking more ‘adaptive’ so that epistemic behavior like 
evidence-collecting is governed in ways that tend to complement rather 
than hinder our other pursuits” (Nagel 2010, p. 2). 
If this is correct, then we have an emotion which helps us represent the 
importance of resolving p, and quickly identify the questions which are 
worth extra cognitive effort. While allocating more cognitive effort to a 
question generally leads to greater accuracy, human cognitive resources are 
limited, which is why we need to be able to strike a balance between 
accuracy and speed in belief-formation. However, striking this compromise 
requires us to be able to quickly and reliably gauge the threshold of evi-
dence that a given question should require, given the practical interests at 
stake in its resolution. 
Indeed, we can only imagine the trouble we would be in, if we had to 
explicitly deliberate about selecting the right strategy regarding the level of 
energy to invest on each given question, and the stopping rule to impose on 
evidence collection. As Nagel remarks, “wondering about finding the right 
moment to close off inquiry and claim knowledge, one may feel haunted by 
Sextus Empiricus’s suggestion that it is always possible to continue the 
search” (Nagel 2010, p. 1). The disposition to experience anxiety about 
whether p might thus be a precious tool to have in our adaptive toolbox, if 
we are to engage in cognitive activities that are adaptive, given the context, 
resources and limitations of human cognition. 
This being said, if epistemic anxiety is part of a natural and adaptive as-
pect of the regulation of our cognitive activities, when the emotion is dys-
functional and does not reliably represent the practical stakes, the subject 
might feel the need to increase cognitive processing and elevate evidence 
requirements where this is irrelevant. I hypothesize that dysfunctional epis-
temic anxiety might have an important role to play in the motivation driving 
persons with OCD to deploy huge cognitive resources for the resolution of 
apparently simple and innocuous questions. In the case of OCD, epistemic 
anxiety might be inappropriately elicited, representing these as high-stakes 
questions, and signaling a need for cognition. This might be particularly 
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relevant to patients with checking symptoms, who are overwhelmed by a 
pressing and recurrent need for verification. 
Where epistemic anxiety is dysfunctional, it is likely that we will find 
ourselves deprived of a helpful guide in our epistemic pursuits. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that epistemic anxiety can be a precious tool of our adap-
tive toolbox and a guide of our epistemic activities. I also suggested that, 
when ill-calibrated, it is likely to result in maladaptive epistemic pursuits. 
OCD might be considered an extreme – and indeed a pathological – exam-
ple of this. 
A more general conclusion one might draw from this discussion, is that 
both an excessive disposition towards epistemic anxiety, and an insufficient 
one can prove detrimental to an individual’s attempts to form beliefs effi-
ciently. Both the “careless” and the “obsessive” are unable to feel appropri-
ate anxiety (or reasonable doubt) and, as a consequence, to allocate cogni-
tive resources where and when it matters. The careless person will overlook 
important details and her social, moral and epistemic mistakes will remain 
unnoticed to her. The obsessive agent will engage in endless deliberation, 
and experience difficulty achieving closure and making decisions. 
However, in human affairs, we cannot always afford to wait until we 
achieve certainty before making a decision. Ecological and practical ration-
ality demand the ability to correctly allocate our cognitive resources, adjust-
ing our epistemic goals to “real-world requirements”. This ability might in 
large part be supported by emotions like epistemic anxiety, which act as 
precious tools in the guidance of our epistemic activities.8 
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